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WRITING COMPETITION 2004-2005

CHRISTINA OKON
Congress Moves to Suspend Judicial Review to Protect the Unconstitutional
Defense of Marriage Act

CONGRESS MOVES TO SUSPEND FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
TO PROTECT THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
Striving to preserve the institution of marriage for heterosexual couples, Congress
passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)' in 1996. DOMA was billed as promoting
state autonomy by letting the states decide whether same-sex couples might legally wed,
and whether or not to validate one another's decisions regarding same-sex marriage. Not
convinced that the states could correctly decide so vital an issue, Congress launched the
Federal Marriage ~mendment'in May 2003, defining marriage as restricted to a legal
union between one man and one woman across the nation. However, fearing the light of
scrutiny by what they call the activist judiciary, Republicans introduced the Marriage
Protection Act (hereafter MPA)~on October 16.2003., to ~rohibitanv federal court from
reviewing cases arising under DOMA. On ~u1;22,2004, the MPA iassed the House by
a substantial majority. At the end of 2004, the MPA remained lodged in the Senate
Committee on Judiciary. On March 30,2005, it was introduced totthe House yet once
more, signed by 59 additional co-sponsors, all but two of them Republican. This article
argues that DOMA and the MPA are unauthorized exercises of Congressional power and
that they strip a disfavored class of citizens of constitutionallyprotected rights. Part I of
this article will review DOMA, while Part I1 considers and refutes Congressional
arguments used in support of the MPA.
A

PART I - THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
DOMA, codified at 28 U.S.C. §1738C, provides that states need not accord one
another full faith and credit with regard to same-sex marriage; thus, a same-sex couple
that traveled to and married in a state that permits same-sex marriage cannot force its
home state to recognize that marriage or any orders entered pursuant to the marriage.
Additionally, DOMA federalizes the definition of marriage, restricting marriage nation
wide to "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife."
A. A Look at Congress' Purported Reasonsfor Passing the DOMA
Congress listed four areas that DOMA was intended to serve: (1) to defend and
nurture the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage; (2) defend traditional notions
of morality; (3) protect state soverei ty and democratic self-governance; and (4) to
preserve scarce economic resources. A look at the proffered reasons shows them to be
without substance.

P'

(1) Defending and Nurturing Heterosexual Marriage.

Representative Lipinski asserted that "allowing for gay marriages would be the
final straw, it would devalue the love between a man and a woman and weaken us as a
l at ion."' In response to statements like those of Lipinski, Jonah M. Crane noted

"[Tlhose who fear that the institution will crumble fail to point to any concrete way in
which the extension of this important social institution to sarne-sex couples will affect
marriages between men and women. Will any husband love his wife less, or any wife her
husband? Will they be less committed? Will they value their marriage vows less? These
questions," says Crane, "must now be answered by gay marriage opponents and must be
answered at once under both a spotlight and a magnifying glass.'"

(2) Defending Traditional Notions of Morality.
Addressing the subject of morality as a reason for DOMA, a recent Harvard Law
Review article noted "TSluch a "iustification clearlv cannot stand after Lawrence Iv.
Texas], which rejected moral disapproval of homosexuality as a legitimate government
interest."' A look at a few opinions voiced by individual Congresspersons reveals that
the phrase "traditional notions of morality" is simply homophobic animosity dressed up
in pleasanter words.

.

.

Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde didn't mince words
when he asserted that most people disapprove of homosexual conduct and that they
express their disapproval of homosexual conduct through the law, as "it is the only way
possible to express this d i ~ a ~ ~ r o b a t i o nTennessee's
."~
Representative Duncan, quoting
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's opinion some years earlier, noted "we have been
defining deviancy down, accepting as part of life what we once found repugnant."9
Representative Coburn opined "I come fiom a district in OMahoma [where people
have] very profound beliefs that homosexuality is wrong.. .. They believe homosexuality
is immoral, that it is based on perversion; that it is based on lust."'0 Representative Barr
declared that "the flames of hedonism. the flames of narcissism. the flames of selfcentered morality are licking at the very foundations of our society: the family unit.""
Barr also opined that same-sex marriage "is an issue that is being used by the homosexual
extremists ;o divide America. It is
of a deliberate, coldly c a ~ c ~ l a t e d ~ ~ move
o w e rto
,,I2
confront the basic social institutions on which our country ... was founded.. . .
Representative Smith stated that "[Olur law should not treat homosexual
relationships as the moral equivalent of the heterosexual relationships on which the
family is based."') Representative Dorman predicted that Congress would be discussing
the legalization of pedophilia within 3 to 4 years as a result of current trends,14 while
Representative Packard warned that "civilizations that have allowed the traditional bonds
of family to be weakened ... have not survived."15
Senator Orin Hatch asserted that he didn't "know anything more important to
morality," or to the "overall well-being of our citizens than the preservation of the
traditional marriage definition that has been the rule for 5,000 -plus years in this world;
that is, that marriage should be between a man and a woman."16 Senator Hatch claims
he's not motivated by bias against homosexuals. Indeed, Senator Hatch proudly asserted
that he led the fight in three AIDS bills as evidence of his lack of bias.I7

(3) Protecting State Sovereignty and Democratic Self-governance.

The argument that DOMA protects state sovereignty dissolves by taking a simple
hypothetical. Assume Donna and Sarah manied in Massachusetts. Seven years later,
they separate or divorce. Donna moves to Florida, leaving the parties' children with
Sarah, the birth mother. The children visit Donna each vacation and holiday. Suppose
that Donna has a court-ordered support obligation for the children and Sarah and that
Florida has laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriages. Would Florida enforce a
support order against Donna? Suppose also that the parties had an order dividing the
community property but one of the parties fails to comply with the order. What recourse
would the other party have? What if the children are involved in an accident while
visiting Donna? Could Donna participate in medical care decisions or visit them in a
hospital intensive care unit or would she be denied admission because she would not be
considered their parent under Florida law? What rights and benefits would the children
have under Florida inheritance laws should Donna die intestate? Obviously, far from
protecting Massachusetts' sovereignty, since its acts and judgments regarding same-sex
marriage don't need to be honored in other states, Massachusetts has just been devalued
as a sovereign power because of the DOMA.
(4) Preserving Scarce Economic Resources.

Given the multitude of federal and state programs designed to benefit marital
partners, it is true that giving same-sex couples equal rights and benefits will shift
allocation of federal and state resources to a degree. However, even this rationale fails to
pass muster. Don't lesbians and homosexuals pay property, gasoline and income taxes
just as their heterosexual counterparts do? That being the case, why should same-sex
couples be denied access to the benefits accorded to heterosexual couples?
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held disparate treatment of disfavored groups
impermissible. For example, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center" the Court held that
a community's fears of mentally retarded citizens was not a valid justification to apply
zoning regulations in a discriminatory manner. Likewise, in United States Department of
Agriculture v. oren no'^ the government was precluded from denying food stamp benefits
based solely on the fact that the household receiving them was unconventional, having
been labeled by the government as a hippie commune. Denying marital privileges to
same-sex couples likewise clearly amounts to disparate treatment of a disfavored class.
While the above-stated reasons provide the official, and rather transparent,
rationale for DOMA, its proponents also favor the following arguments.
B. Additional Congressional Arguments Raised in Support ofDOUA

Additional arguments raised by DOMA's sponsors include: 1) the dictionary
defines marriage as being between one man and one woman; 2) traditional marriage has
been the rule for more than 5,000 years; 3) procreation is the primary reason for

marriage; and 4) homosexuality is unnatural. A look at these favorites reveals that like
DOMA itself, they can't withstand the light of scrutiny.

(1) The dictionary defines marriage as a legal union between one man and one woman.
Alec Walen, Graduate Fellow in the Program in Ethics and Professions, Haward
University responded to some of the arguments raised in support of DO MA:^ including
this one. Walen noted that language changes, as do dictionary definitions?' Aside from
the changes seen in dictionary definitions, marriage itself has changed through the ages.
Today's marital partners come into the union on a more equal footing. It should also go
without saying that dictionary definitions should not be elevated to legal status.
(2) Traditional Marriage Has Been The Rule For 5,000 Plus Years.

Senators Thurmond, Gramm and Hatch favor this argument." In response, Walen
noted that King Solomon had over 700 wives and that Jacob, the son of Isaac, married
both Leah and Rachel, having children through them as well as with their handmaids?'
While Congress would undoubtedly disfavor these domestic arrangements, there are no
biblical accounts of Jehovah destroying King Solomon's 699 extras in a fit of moral
righteousness. One might also wonder what particular "tradition" Congress had in mind
since traditions have changed markedly even since Blackstone's definition offered 250
years ago when he declared "the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during
(3) The Primary Reason For Marriage Is Procreation.
Some of DOMA's proponents, including Senator Byrd, declare that giving life to
children is the primary purpose for marriage.25 The argument goes that since gays and
lesbians presumptively can't have children, at least not without the aid of a third party
such as a sperm or egg donor, there is no point to them marrying. This view debases
marriage, while discounting other valid reasons people many, including the desire for
lifelong commitment, companionship, to pool resources, and to share mutual goals. As
noted by the Supreme Court in Turner v. ~ a j Z e ~even
; ~ prisoners whose ability to
procreate is a literal impossibility have a fundamental right to marry during their
incarceration.
The Vermont Supreme court noted that furthering the link between procreation
and child rearing was substantially underinclusive since many opposite-sex couples
marry for reasons unrelated to procreation; some because they are unable to have
children, others because they choose not to." Additionally, this position disregards the
fact that 34.3 percent of female and 22.3 percent of male same-sex families have
. through artificial insemination, adoption, or from prior marriages. As
children,28 elther
noted by Summer L. Nastich, "studies c o n f m that children raised by gay and lesbian
individuals are just as healthy and happy as children raised by heterosexual

individual^."'^

More important, however, the world is not suffering a dearth in the birth rate.
With the world's population at a staggering 6.25 billion people, natural resources are
rapidly vanishing, leading to disastrous living conditions globally.30 If anything, world
governments should be encouraging and rewarding restraints on procreation, rather than
arguing about the best domestic setting for increasing our numbers.

(4) Homosexuality is Unnatural
Homosexuality has presumably existed since the dawn of time, and as any farmer
.
can attest, same-sex animals often engage in sexual conduct with one another. Having
always existed, it must perforce be part of nature, even while being numerically less
prevalent than heterosexuality. Of interest in this regard were studies conducted by Harry
and Margaret Harlow at the University of Wisconsin decades ago. The studies revealed
that primates raised in isolation did not know what to do with their sexual urges when
brought together with other members of their species. The monkeys possessed no innate
knowledge that females should exclusivelv couvle with males.31 Indeed. the Harlows
noted the monkeys "exhibited almost every kind of behavior except one - heterosexual
behavior, which was conspicuous by its absence."32 While primates and humans are not
identical, it is rather evocative to consider that heterosexualbehavior may be learned,
rather than natural. behavior.

-

The argument that homosexuality is unnatural echoes earlier Congressional
rhetoric espoused in thwarting interracial maniage for nearly a century. In 1863,
Wisconsin Senator Doolittle declared "intermarriages between the races are forbidden as
criminal. Why forbidden? Simply because natural instinct revolts at it as wrong."33
History reveals that America went through a period of intense antagonism
towards interracial marriages, with thirty-eight states enacting miscegenation
almost the same number of states that have passed mini-DOMAs. In upholding the
miscegenation statute, the court in Scott v. ~ e o r g i a declared
~'
"amalgamation of the
races.. .is...unnatural," and bound to lead to the creation of "generally sickly and
effeminate offspring." James Trosino noted that during those decades "white supremacist
ideology infected the national political process. Congressmen invoked "scientific" proof
of Negro inferiority during debate over civil rights laws."36
The furor against the mixing of the races went beyond interracial marriages.
striking down the
Following the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of ~ducation,3~
"separate but equal" holding of Plessy v. ~ur~erson,3'
more than one hundred members
of Congress om eleven states signed a tract declaring the decision "a clear abuse of
judicial ower" and commending the states to "resist enforced integration by any
means."

P

In 1963, the Supreme Court declared miscegenation laws unconstitutional,
holding in Loving v. Virginiaqothat the fundamental right to marry includes being able to
decide whether or not to marry, as well as the choice of marital partner. While interracial
marriages are by no means the norm today, interracial spouses need no longer fear the

legal reprisals of earlier years. It is also questionable whether the current level of
acceptance of interracial marriage would have manifested without the Supreme Court
decision in Loving. Thus it is all the more vital that federal jurisdiction be preserved to
strike down unconstitutional laws such as DOMA and the MPA.
C. Changing Social Trends Support Same-Sex Marriage
At the time DOMA passed, no state had legalized same-sex marriage. However,
Congress was spurred into action by Baehr v. ~ewin?'the first case to challenge the
denial of a mamage license to same-sex couples. The Baehr court held the denial of the
marriage permit to be an unconstitutional infringement of the couples' equal protection
rights and ordered the permits to be issued, while also giving the legislature time to
respond to the decision. To prevent same-sex marriage from becoming a reality, the
Hawaiian legislature rapidly passed laws precluding same-sex partners fiom being able to
marry. Alaska's legislature soon followed with a similar ballet to prevent the court's
holding in Brause v. Bureau of Vital ~tatistics~~fiom
making same-sex marriage a reality
in Alaska.
1.

Acceptance of same-sex marriage abroad

Congress was undoubtedly also aware of increasing acceptance of homosexuals
s ~ ~ of sameand lesbians, both in the United States and abroad. Mark E. ~ 0 j c i k . review
sex marriage legislation in other countries noted that Sweden gave limited recognition to
same-sex couples by 1987. Denmark debated the issue for twenty years, passing
partnership legislation in 1989, while Norway followed with its own registered partner
legislation in 1993. Hungary amended its Common Law Mamage Act in 1996 to extend
coverage to same-sex couples. France enacted the Pacte Civil de Solidarit in 1999. The
act is more restrictive that registered partnership acts of other countries but more liberal
than registered partnership laws in the United States. Wojcik notes that Germany enacted
"The Law on Ending Discrimination Against Same-Sex Communities" in 2001,
providing limited rights to same-sex partners.
Wojcik reported that the Netherlands became the first country to sanction samesex marriage, giving full equivalent rights and benefits to same-sex spouses as those
traditionally enjoyed by heterosexual couples. Belgium soon followed, although it did
not accord ay and lesbian couples the right to adopt children. More recently, in Halpern
v. Canada,6 the Ontario Court of Appeals upheld the right of same-sex couples to many.
The Canadian government did not appeal the decision; instead, it enacted enabling
legislation. The trend internationally clearly favors marital rights for same-sex couples.
2.

Acceptance of same-sex marriage in America

Last fall, the Massachusetts Supreme Court handed down Goodridge v. Dept. of
~
that the statute that denied same-sex couples the right to get a
Public ~ e a l t h :declaring
marriage license was unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Massachusetts' Constitution. The court noted that the Constitution "affirms the

dignity and equality of all individuals.. .forbidding the creation of second-class citizens."
The Goodridge holding led to legalization of same-sex marriage within that state. Unlike
Hawaii and Alaska, the Massachusetts' legislature did not have time to enact a statute to
nullify the court's decision. Only time will tell whether it will opt to do so. In the
interim, more than 3,000 same-sex couples have been married in ~ a s s a c h u s e t t s . ~ ~
As a result of the Vermont Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. ~tate,4'holding
the denial of benefits to same-sex couples unconstitutional, the state enacted a civil union
statute, 48essentiallyreaffirming the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples while
granting all of the benefits of marriage to same-sex couples.
The prevailing current trend clearly favors marriage rights for same-sex couples.
It is simply a matter of time until Congress becomes more enlightened. Hopefully, the
United States Constitution will not have been completely dismantled by the short-sighted
majority before that day arrives.
D. Asserted Congressional Authoriv for Passing DOMA
Congress contends that its authority for DOMA comes from Article IV, Section 1
~ ~ section provides "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
of the ~ o n s t i t u t i o n .This
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect thereof."
A plain meaning reading of this clause fails to reveal a grant of authority allowing
Congress to urge the suspension of the full faith and credit clause among the states.
Instead, congress was accorded authority to "prescribe" specifics as to how one state
might validate another's acts, records and proceedings. Clearly, Congress subverted and
exceeded the Constitution's grant of authority when it transformed the phrase "prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved" to include the
diametrical opposite authority. As Congress would have us believe, Article IV,Section 1
actually provides "Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such
acts, records and proceedings shall be approved or disapproved and the Effect thereof."
The canons of statutory construction require that words within statutes be given
their ordinary, common meaning, unless they are technical terms of art. Statutes should
also be construed so as to avoid unconstitutional results.50In addition, various provisions
of a statute should be construed so as to be consistent with each other so that no part is
rendered superfluous." In other words, a statute should be read so as to avoid internal
inconsistencies. Since the Constitution mandates Full Faith and Credit shall be eiven.
any interpretation by Congress that converts the mandate to may either be given or
withheld, acts to nullify a clause that was intended by the framers to unite the States.
Congress has no authority to abrogate Constitutional mandates, absent an amendment.
While it is true that Congress drafted and circulated its Federal Marriage Amendment, the
Amendment was not ratified. That being the case, Congress should not be permitted to
assign tortured meanings to ordinary words.

-

E . Criticism of DOMA

Scholars have been outspoken in their criticism of DOMA. Professor Laurence
Tribe of Harvard Law School, in a letter submitted for the record in Senate proceedings
on June 6, 1996, stated: "My conclusion is unequivocal. Congress possess no power
under any provision of the Constitution to legislate as it does in DOMA an such
categorical exemption f?om the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV? The ACLU
in a background briefing in February of 1996 said "DOMA is bad constitutional law; an
unmistakable violation of the ~onstitution."~~
Professor Stanley E. Cox noted that "DOMA is unconstitutional, not primarily
because it authorizes ignoring final judgments from solely interested states, although it is
clearly suspect on these grounds. The statute is more fundamentally unconstitutional
because it replaces state sovereign lawmaking power with congressional back door
attempts to legislate substantive rules."54
Another scholar noted that DOMA violates equal protection principles because it
is motivated by animus towards homosexuals as a class and in that it makes same-sex
couples ineligible for a wide variety of legal protections and governmental benefits
available to opposite-sex couples without any rational basis for doing so.55
Kevin J. Worthen, Professor of Law and Associate Dean, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, Brigham Young University, stated that "a federal statute defining marriage as
including or excluding samesex couples for all purposes nationwide would clearly be at
odds with the limited national legislative power feature of the federal component of "our"
system of government and, for that reason, would likely be held unc~nstitutional."~~
Maggie Gallagher, President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy in
Washington, D.C. noted that "the legal benefits flowing from a marriage license are of
such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public
concerns of sufficient weight, cogency and authority that the justice of the deprivation
cannot seriously be questioned. Considered in light of the extreme logical disjunction
between the classification and the stated purpose of the law - protecting children and
'furthering the link between procreation and child rearing' - the exclusion falls
substantially short of this ~tandard."~'
There are, of course, scholars supporting DOMA as well. Dwight G. Duncan,
Associate Professor of constitutional law at Southern New England School of Law has
been particularly vocal, having supplied amicus briefs in several of the leading cases that
have addressed same-sex marriage this decade. Duncan warns that "recent developments
in family law, both in the United States and abroad necessitate a national strate
preserve marriage's central role in the creation and formation of our posteri,."!'he
primary thrust of Duncan's argument is that "marriage still matters because children still
matter," and that "common sense says that children are best raised by both a mother and a
father." While relying on "common sense," Professor Duncan appears to be indifferent
to or unaware of the studies like those of Perrin and ~ u l i n : ~
which found no evidence

that the children of gay and lesbian parents experience any particular difficulties as a
result of their parents' sexual orientation.

F. Marriage as a Constihrtional Right
Notably, the proponents for and against DOMA can't agree on what marriage
actually is: a constitutional right or a heterosexual institution. Many of those who can't
understand what the fuss is about might agree with May West who was heard to quip,
"Marriage is a great institution, but I'm not ready for an i n s t i t ~ t i o n . ' ~ ~
In Loving v. virginia,6' the Supreme Court said "the freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men." Loving upheld the right to marry, as well as the choice of
marriage partner, as a vital right, holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious
racial discriminations." More recently, in Lawrence v. ~exas,6*striking down a Texas
law against sodomy, the Supreme Court noted that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life," and that "when sexuality finds over expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons to make
this choice."
While Lawrence did not reach the decision that the government must give formal
recognition to same-sex marriage, the opinion foreshadows approval, noting "[Tlhe
Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and ed~cation."~~
Indeed, dissenting Justice Scalia, noting
this foreshadowing, expressed his disapproval by stating "[Tloday's opinion dismantles
the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is
c~ncemed."~~
Given the premise that the right to many entails fundamental liberty interests
protected by the Constitution, DOMA substantially destroys those rights for same-sex
couples. As such, in addition to the fact that Congress was not authorized to sanction and
encourage suspension of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the DOMA should be struck
down by the Supreme Court as violating important Constitutional rights.
It is, of course, precisely this fear, coupled with the belief that federal judges are
out of touch with American values, which has prompted Congress to draft the Marriage
Protection Act precluding federal judicial review. In his remarks on July 22,2004, in
support of the Marriage Protection Act, Congressman Pearce (R. New Mexico) stated "I
rise to support this rule, because this debate must be removed from the courts who (sic)
are filled with unelected, lifetime judges.. ." However, shielding the DOMA from
judicial review through passage of the MPA, threatens the very structure of our system of

government since it negates the horizontal checks and balances so carehlly wrought by
the founders between the three branches of the federal government, as well as the vertical
checks and balances between the federal and state governments. Additionally, such
shielding impermissibly excludes a disfavored minority from the courthouse, thereby
violating due process, and equal protection as well as the privileges and immunities
clauses. A look at the Marriage Protection Act and a discussion of why it is
unconstitutional follows.
PART I1 - THE MARRIAGE PROTECTION ACT
Launched in 2003, it was known as 'The Marriage Protection Act of 2004" last
year and is currently known as the "Marriage Protection Act of 2005," (hereafter the
MPA). The MPA is legislation that seeks to amend title 28, United States Code, to
prohibit Federal court jurisdiction over questions under the DOMA. Without the right of
judicial review, marriage, that bastion of heterosexual relationships, is expected to remain
sacrosanct. Specifically, the MPA provides:
No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any
question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the
Constitution of, section 1738C or this section.
Congress asserts that Article I11 of the Constitution provides a grant of authority65
for passage of the MPA, and that the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 provides ample
precedent legitimizing the MF'A.~~While the Constitution gave Congress substantial
discretion to fashion the federal judicial landscape, nowhere is Congress authorized to
violate individual Constitutional rights as they have evolved since 1789. A brief review
of the specific grants of Constitutional authority follows, together with examples of how
Congress has previously applied its grant of authority to restrict judicial review.
A. The Constitutional Provisions Establishing The Federal Courts
Initially, it should be noted that the Constitution itself was rather vague with
respect to the judicial branch of the federal government as can be seen in the brevity of
Article III. While Article I of the Constitution, addressed to the creation and powers of
Congress, contains ten sections, some of which have as many as eighteen subsections,
Article 111pertaining to the federal judiciary contains merely three sections, none
containing more than three subsections. Thus, while the Constitution mandated the
creation of one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may create from time
to time, it was silent as to how many judges would sit on the Supreme Court, or how
many inferior federal courts might be appropriate. The pertinent provisions of Article III
follow.
Article 111, Section 1 provides in part: 'The judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
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Article III, Section 2(1) provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a party; to Controversies between two or
more States; between Citizens of different States, between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."
Article 111, Section 2(2) provides that some of the Supreme Court jurisdiction
shall be original, while the balance is to be appellate. Thus "[Iln all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make."
With respect to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over "all cases ... arising under
this Constitution" and under "the Laws of the United States," since the Constitution made
this jurisdiction appellate, it follows that unless Congress created inferior courts, the
Constitutional claims would necessarily arise from state courts. Such inferior federal
courts were in fact established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
B. The Judicialy Act of 1789

Enacted by the new Congress as its first piece of business for the new Republic,
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, known officially as "An Act to Establish the
Judicial Courts of the United States," (hereafter "the Act,") set up the initial parameters
of the federal courts. Thus the Act set forth the number of Supreme Court justices, the
number and location of inferior federal courts, and the pay of federal judges, among other
matters. The Act also restricted appellate jurisdiction of Constitutional claims, providing
at Section 25, that federal courts could only take cases by writ of review in which the
state court's decision was adverse as to the validity of a federal statute or treaty. In
addition, the Act attempted to alter the Supreme Court's jurisdiction from that set forth in
the Constitution, giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in matters of mandamus.
However, within a couple of years of the Act's passage, in Marbuly v. ~adison,6'Justice
Marshall declared Section 13 of the Act unconstitutional. Marbury has been cited since
1803 in support of the right of judicial review of legislative acts.
C. Marbuly v. Madison Supports Judicial Review of Legislative Acts
By far one of the most famous cases in American jurisprudence, Marbuly v.
Madison involved the right of petitioner Marbury to his commission as justice of the
peace. In the waning hours of his administration, Federalist President John Adams had

created numerous judicial positions, filling the posts with Federalists. Through the
Circuit Court Act of 1801, Adams created sixteen federal circuit court judgeships, while
the Organic Act of the District of Columbia created forty-two judgeships, including
Marbury's Justice of the Peace position. Adams had implemented this court-packing
plan to safeguard the new Republic from incoming Thomas Jefferson, and his antifederalist cohorts.6'
Marbury's commission had been signed by President Adams and sealed by John
Marshall on the last day of the Adams' administration, and shortly before Marshall's new
position as Justice of the Supreme Court c0mmenced.6~However, due to the haste of the
proceedings at the eleventh hour of the Adams' administration, Marbury failed to receive
his commission before Jefferson took office. Marbury filed suit in the Supreme Court for
issuance of a writ of mandamus, seeking to force the new Secretary of State, James
Madison, to deliver the commission.
Incoming Republican President Thomas Jefferson, the founding father most
opposed to a strong judiciary, had not looked with favor on John Adams' parting action, a
fact of which new Justice Marshall was keenly aware. Indeed, President Jefferson and
the incoming Republicans promptly caused the Circuit Court Act of 1801 to be repealed.
This took place while Marbury's case was pending in the Supreme Court. In addition,
the new administration caused the June and December terms of the Court to be abolished,
an unmistakable and mounting sign of Republican hostility towards the

In rendering his decision, Justice Marshall determined that Marbury had a right to
the commission, and that he also had a remedy. But apparently the remedy chosen by
Marbury, based on Section 13 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, turned out to be
incorrect. Justice Marshall determined that Section 13, purporting to bestow original
"iurisdiction in matters of writs of mandamus on the Sunreme Court was unconstitutional.
Since Congress had no authority to bestow original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court if it
was not granted in the constitution. Since the case also hadn't arisen from a lower court,
Justice Marshall found that the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Justice
Marshall noted "the constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is
alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.'"' With respect to the Court's right
to review legislative act, Justice Marshall also declared:
"[qt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts
must decide on the operations of each. So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so
that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding
the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the
court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is
of the very essence ofjudicial duty. If then, the courts are to regard the
constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the

legislature, the constitution, and not the ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply."
Because Marbuiy declared an act of Congress unconstitutional, Marbury is most
often cited in support of the Court's right of judicial review of legislative acts. However,
while Justice Marshall's decision was ingenious, it was not actually original since it
merely echoes the position voiced by Hamilton in one or more of the Federalist Papers
that had been publicly circulated to gamer approval for the proposed government.
D. The Intent of the Framers Supports Judicial Review
When considering the constitutionality of acts of Congress, it is customary to look to
the intent of the framers with regards to the underlying conflict. The subject of the right
and authority of the federal courts to review acts of Congress was addressed by
Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist No. 78*: reflecting the following observations:
Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts
void, because contrary to the constitution, has arisen from an imagination that
the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power.
It is urged that the authority which can declare acts of another void, must
necessarily be superior to the one whose acts are declared [void].
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a
delegated authority, contrary to the commission under which it is exercised, is
void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To
deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the
servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to
the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only
what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
If it be said the legislative body are themselves the constitutionaljudges of their
own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the
other devartments. it mav be answered. that this cannot be the natural
presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the
constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the constitution could intend
to enable the representatives of the peopld to substitute their will to that of their
constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law.
It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning of any particular act
proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an
irreconcilable difference between the two, that which has the superior obligation
and validity ought of course to be preferred; in other words, the constitution

ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of
their agents.
It is clear from the foregoing excerpt that Hamilton, speaking on behalf of many of
his fellow framers, intended the judicial branch to exercise review over acts of Congress
and to cause laws found to be repugnant to the constitution to be set aside. While
Hamilton also recognized the involvement of the legislature, he at no time stated that the
legislature could either completely destroyjudicial review or suspend established
constitutional rights. In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton stated:
To avoid all inconveniences, it will be safest to declare generally, that the
Supreme Court shall possess appellate jurisdiction [that] shall be subject to such
exceptions and regulations as the national legislature may prescribe. This will
enable the government to modify it in such a manner as will best answer the
ends of public justice and security.
While this section of Federalist No. 81 appears to provide support for Congress'
position that it has the authority vested in it to eliminate Supreme Court review of
particular subjects, it flies in the face of Hamilton's clear explanation that laws that are
made in contravention of the constitution cannot stand. It would have been unthinkable
to the founders that Congress could, by use of Hamilton's suggestion in Federalist No.
81, enact unconstitutional laws and thereafter also shield such laws from judicial scrutiny.
At the time Hamilton published his views on the federal judiciary, it would have
been scarcely conceivable to him and his fellow founders that the Supreme Court would
have sitting justices who were female or African-American within less than two hundred
years. Yet, because of the way the Republic was set up, allowing for flexibility and the
growth of individual rights and liberties throughout the decades, the face of government
has changed. The Judiciary Act that was passed in 1875 marked a crucial expansion of
the Court's jurisdiction.
E. B e Judiciary Act of 1875 Extended Full Judicial Power
President Adams' administration had attempted to expand the scope ofjudicial
review, giving the Supreme Court the full jurisdiction accorded by the Constitution in
passing the Judiciary Act of 1801. However, as noted above, Jefferson's administration
swiftly caused the repeal of laws expandin the scope and size of the judiciary. It wasn't
7
.
until passage of the Judiciary Act of 1875 that junsdlction of the federal courts was
fully extended to embrace "all rights arising under the Constitution." This act was seen
as a "turning point in the history of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, for they became
free to accept jurisdiction of any claim or any right arising under a federal statute to
determine if they had juri~diction."~~
However, based on the Article 111provisions noted above, together with the
control exercised by Congress through the Judiciary Act of 1789 for eighty-six years,
Representative Hostettler (R. Ind.), author of the MPA, believes Congress can also

suspend judicial review of any case it pleases. "[Slo the United States Constitution is
very clear," Hostettler declared. "Congress has the authority to create the inferior Federal
courts. Congress has the authority to make exceptions and regulations with regard to all
of the appellate cases that come before the Supreme Court. Anyone that actually reads
the Constitution and has a basic understanding of grammar and the English language in
general can find that in fact the Constitution grants Congress authority."75
Representative Sensenbrenner asserted that "the most cursory review of American
history shows that ...the very first Judiciary Act of 1789 denied the Federal courts
original jurisdiction and the Supreme Court appellatejurisdiction to review the
constitutionality of literally thousands of Federal statutes under a jurisdictional regime
that governed for roughly a century."76
Representatives Hostettler and Sensenbrenner and their cohorts clearly confuse
Constitutional authority to establish inferior federal courts with authority to reverse or
destroy more than two hundred years of hard-won progress to secure the blessings of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness to all American citizens, not just the majority who
happen to be in power at the moment. A review of prior occasions on which Congress
has exercised its authority to restrict federal judicial review follows.
F. Historical Measures by Congress to Restrict Federal Judicial Review
In 1868, only three years following the end of the civil war, Congress acted to
prevent the Supreme Court from deciding what was deemed an unpopular political case,
Exparte ~ c c a r d l e . ~McCardle,
'
a newspaper editor, was held in custody by military
authority for trial due to publication of articles held to be incendiary. McCardle applied
for writ of habeas corpus under the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, authorizing the grant of such
writs. The petition was denied and McCardle was returned to prison. As allowed under
the Act of 1867, he then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. After the Court
had listened to oral arguments but before a decision had been rendered, Congress, over
the President's veto, passed the Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44, repealing the right of
appeal to the Supreme Court. In this manner, McCardle's appeal became moot.78 It is
clear that this particular Congressional act was intended to affect a single litigant who
was deemed to sow political dissention following the feverish days of the civil war and
the social unrest created in its aftermath.

Another early instance of Congressional intervention, again responding to the
national unrest shortly after civil war, was the Act of 1870, passed in response to the
~ U.S. v. Padelfod, 80 pertaining to
Supreme Court's decisions in U.S.v. ~ n d e r s o n ?and
the seizure of property belonging to rebels of the Confederacy. The Act declared it to be
government policy that individuals prove their loyalty irrespective of any executive
proclamation, pardon or grant of amnesty in certain claims. The Supreme Court was
directed on appeal to dismiss the cases for lack of jurisdiction in "all cases where
judgment shall have been heretofore rendered in the court of claims in favor of an
claims on any other proof of loyalty than such as is above required or provided.''8rlt is
evident from these Congressional acts that the country experienced severely trying times

following the civil war and that the acts were intended to safeguard the very existence of
the Republic.

In 1887, twelve years after expanding federal jurisdiction, Congress amended the
Act of 1875 to stem the flow of suits being brought before the federal courts.82 The
jurisdictional amount in diversity cases was increased from $500 to $2,000; suits could
no longer be brought in districts where the defendant was found, but instead would be
restricted to such district where the defendant resided; banks were now considered
citizens of the state of incorporation rather than citizens of states in which they were
doing business, thereby withdrawingjurisdiction based solely on a bank's location.
Jacob Trieber notes "this piece of legislation was considered by many members of the bar
as wise in contracting the jurisdiction of the national courts.""
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More recently, Congress acted to preserve federal reserves by passing the Portal
to Portal Act of 1947:~removing federal court jurisdiction in any case arising under the
part of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 that required employers to compensate
overtime retroactively. Federal courts had seen 1,913 new actions between July 1, 1946
and January 3 1, 1947, together claiming over Five Billion Dollars in overtime for work
performed prior to the passage of Fair Labor Standards Act (hereafter "FLSA"). At the
time the Act was passed, the potential liability of the federal govenunent exceeded One
and a-half Billion ~ o l l a r s . 8The
~ Portal to Portal Act essentially exempted all overtime
salaries that accrued prior to May 14, 1947 by taking away federal court jurisdiction of
such claims. Specifically, the Portal-to-Portal Act provided:
No court of the United States, or any State, Tenitory, or possession of the
United States, or the District of Columbia, shall have jurisdiction of any action
or proceeding, whether instituted prior to or on or after May 14, 1947, to enforce
liability or impose punishment for or on account of the failure of the employer to
pay minimum wages or overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards
of 1938, as amended, under the Walsh-Healy Act, or under the Bacon-Davis
Act, to the extent that such action or proceeding seeks to enforce any liability or
impose any punishment with respect to any activity which was not compensable
under subsections a and b of the Section.
Professors Hart and Wechsler note "[at was claimed that the Act, in its retroactive
operation, destroyed vested rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The contention
was universally rejected on the merit^."'^
Notwithstanding the Portal-to-Portal Act, the federal courts of appeals and most
district courts treated cases under FLSA as o en to decision, despite the jurisdictional
provisions and the usual separability clause? Thus the Second Circuit in Battaglia v.
General Motors ~ o r ~ o r a t i o nnoted
, 8 ~ that "while Congress has the undoubted power to
give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction of the courts other than the Supreme Court, it
must not exercise that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or pro erty without
due process of law or to take private property without just compensation."Blt should
also be noted that the Portal-to-Portal Act did not apply in any case where the parties had

specifically contracted for overtime pay. Therefore, the Act did not destroy reasonable
expectations of the workers who had signed on when overtime pay was not the norm.
As late as 1950, diversity cases constituted one-third of the federal judicial case
load, a fact that led Congress to try and repeal diversity jurisdiction, but without success.
In 1958 Congress took additional steps to curb access to the federal courts by declaring
that corporations were citizens of the state of incorporation as well as of the states in
which they did business, thereby defeating diversity jurisdiction in numerous cases. At
the same time, the right to remove worker's compensation cases to federal court was
abolished.
G. The MPA Fails the Congruence, Proportionality and Rational Basis Tests
In assessing the validity of an act of Congress, courts consider whether the act is
congruent and proportional to the problem allegedly sought to be remedied. Thus, in City
, ~Court
~
determined that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of Boerne v. ~ l o r e sthe
of 1993 was an unauthorized enactment since religious fieedom was not suffering such
setbacks as to warrant passage of the Act. Although these tests are normally applied to
enactments under Clause 5 of the 1 4 ' ~Amendment, it is appropriate to ask what evils
Conmess was seeking to remedv when it enacted DOMA in the first D lace. As the
introductory paragraphs makes clear, Congress intended to prevent the perceived evil of
homosexual and lesbian couples enjoying the varieties of domestic bliss, legal standing,
and benefits that come with the social and personal commitment known as marriage. At
the time of DOMA's enactment, there was no evidence that same-sex maniage is an evil
that destroys the health and welfare of our Republic, or which requires the type of remedy
sought to be imposed through the DOMA. The MPA is intended to keep DOMA in place
and to prevent the light ofjudicial scrutiny from reaching it. Like DOMA itself, it was
also enacted without evidence that heterosexual marriage is in need of such protection,
although listening to the debates on the floor of the House, it appears that by permitting
same-sex coupled to wed, heterosexual marriage is doomed.
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Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Lawrence v. axa as;' suggested using a
heightened scrutiny standard of review, stating "...moral disapproval of this group
[homosexuals]' like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to
satisfy the rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, we never
held that a moral disapproval without any other state interest, is a sufficient rationale
under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons."
While members of Congress did not discuss the rational basis or congruence and
proportionality tests, as shown by excerpts of Congressional debate below, members of
Congress were keenly aware of the provisions of Article 111, as well as the holding in
Marbury v. Madison. Yet, proponents of the MPA blithely disregard the numerous
illegalities posed by DOMA and the MF'A, and the fact that both serve to diminish the
Constitution and to disrupt the balance of powers between the three branches.

H. Exceqts of Congressional Debates Concerning the MPA
Author of the MPA, Hostettler, during discussions in the House Committee on the
Judiciary on July 14,2004, defended DOMA by asserting that Congress had the right to
pass DOMA "[Slimply because Article N, Section 1, of the Constitution gives Congress
explicit and exclusive authority to regulate full faith and credit relationships between the
States. There is no need for the Federal courts to consider the question about Congress'
authority when Congress' authority is so clearly expounded in the ~onstitution.'"~
Hostettler repeated these words several times during the course of that discussion, as
though sheer repetition of this fallacy would convince his listeners of the correctness of
his position. But as noted above, unless tortured beyond recognition, the right to
prescribe the manner in which full faith and credit shall be accorded between the states is
not the right to dictate that full faith and credit may be entirely dispensed with.
When asked whether he had ever seen legislation that entirely precluded judicial
review, Hostettler, who is on record as stating that Marbuly v. Madison was wrongly
decided with respect to judicial review,93responded that the state courts could decide
matters O~DOMA.his led, of course; to thk next point; i.e., what happens when
different states render different decisions on the constitutionality of DOMA. Without
Supreme Court review of conflicting state decisions, there would be a patchwork quilt of
decisions and no way to have those decisions unified. This prospect did not trouble
Hostettler or his right-wing cohorts. Of course, Hostettler was the same member of
Congress who on July 22,2004, asserted "...the thing you need to understand about
constitutional law is it has virtually nothing to do with the ~onstitution.'"~
Representative John Conyers, Jr., @. Mich.), commenting on the MPA, obsewed
that "[Alt first glance, its proponents seem to have forgotten that our laws need to be
constitutional. We all know fiom the Constitution and Marbuly v. Madison that it is the
role of the federal courts and the Supreme Court to review federal law. Yet that is
exactly what this bill prohibits, virtually asking to be overturned. In some ways, this bill
should not be a surprise because Republicans always try to remove federal courts fiom
the process when courts might issue rulings contrary to right-wing beliefs. They did not
like the Ten Commandments or Pledge of Allegiance decisions, so they introduced
numerous bills to prevent federal courts from hearing cases on those two declarations.
They also severely limited the ability of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for
state convi~tions."~'
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee Sensenbrenner (R. Wis.) voiced his
support for the MPA by declaring that "far &om violating separation of powers, as some
have alleged, legislation that leaves State courts with jurisdiction to decide certain classes
of cases would be an exercise of one of the very checks and balances provided for in the
Constitution. No branch of the Federal Government can be entrusted with absolute
power and certainly not a handful of tenured Federal judges who are appointed for life.
The Constitution allows an exercise ofjudicial power, but it does not grant the Federal
courts unchecked power to define the limits of its own power. Integral to the American
constitutional system is each branch of the Government's responsibility to use its powers

to prevent overreaching by the other branches."96 According to Mr. Sensenbrenner,
suspending federal judicial review assures preservation of the checks and balances of our
system of government.
Representative Nadler @. New York), arguing against the MPA, noted that
"[Tlhe hysteria over the marriage question has brought us to the point of considering a
bill that would strip the Federal courts of the jurisdiction to hear cases involving alleged
violations of an individual's rights protected under our Constitution. These proposals are
neither good law nor good policy. Past attempts to restrict court jurisdiction have
followed many civil rights discussions, including the reapportionment cases. No less a
liberal icon than Bany Goldwater battled court-stripping bills on school prayer, busing
and abortion, which were the big issues of those days. He warned his colleagues that,
quite, the frontal assault on the independence of the Federal courts is a dangerous blow to
the foundations of the free society, close quote. It is still true today. I trust that decades
from now these debates will find their way into the textbooks next to the segregationist
backlash of the 1950's, the court packing plan of the 1930's and other attacks on our
system of ~ovemment."~'
Representative Scott, as did others, reminded the Committee of the Judiciary that
distinguished legal scholars Gerhard and Martin ~edish?' who had been called to provide
their expert opinions as to the constitutionality of the MPA, had cautioned Congress
against suspendingjudicial review. Professor Redish observed "[Tlo be sure, several
other guarantees contained in the constitution, due process, separation of powers and
equal protection, impose limitations on the scope of Congressional power. The due
process clause of the fifth amendment requires that a neutral independent and competent
judicial forum remain available in cases in which the liberty or property interests of an
individual or entity are at stake. The constitutional directive of equal protection that
restricts Congressional power to employ its power to restrict jurisdiction in an
unconstitutional discriminatory manner. And as the Supreme Court made clear in the
Romer case, when the motivation for legislation is to deprive a specific class of people, in
this case, gays and lesbians, of their access to the courts, it is a violation of the equal
protection clause."99 However, having called upon these distinguished scholars, the
faction pushing this agenda simply ignored the warning.
Representative Dennis Moore addressed the House on these points as well, stating
on September 8,2004, "[Wlhile Congress has broad authority under Article EI of our
Constitution to regulate the jurisdiction, procedures and remedies available in state and
federal courts to hear cases regarding particular, controversial areas of constitutional law,
such as school busing, abortion, prayer in school, and recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, Congress' Article III authority is generally used to address broad issues of
court eficiency and resource allocation, rather than to allocate judicial power in a way
that affects or influences the result in cases containing specific constitutional issues.
Limiting the jurisdiction of any court for any particular class of cases raises questions
regarding both the separation of powers doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause of our
~onstitution."'~~

111. CONCLUSION

As evident, Congress acts with proper authority when it attempts to shield federal
courts from being inundated with cases by changingjurisdictional amounts or aspects of
citizenship of corporations. As some of the arguments voiced above confirm, in the not
too distant past, Congress has attempted to strip the federal courts ofjurisdiction when
issues of national concern arise that Congress does not wish to subject to federal judicial
scrutiny. These issues have included segregation, prayer in the schools, the pledge of
allegiance, the Ten Commandments, and busing of students. However, despite repeated
efforts by right-wing idealists like Hostettler and Sensenbrenner, Congress has not yet
succeeded in enacting legislation attempting to shield its own unconstitutional acts from
being reviewed by the federal judiciary. Since the courts are the last bastion of hope for
the protection of minorities against mainstream fears and aspirations, allowing Congress
to slam the courthouse door shut, would set back civil rights in this country for decades to
come.
Congress has power to limit jurisdiction of federal courts pursuant to Article III,
but has no inherent authority to abolish civil rights, to violate the Privileges and
Immunities, Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses, or to pass legislation that is
discriminatory on its face and motivated by moral disapproval of homosexuality.
The Marriage Protection Act has been called a "a mean-spirited, unconstitutional,
dangerous distraction," and a bill whose intent is "to close the door to the Federal
courthouse for an entire group of American citizens simply because of their sexual
~rientation."'~'Other members of Congress have called it "an ill-conceived precedent
that will deny the citizens of America judicial review, due process, and equal protection
under the law."lo2 Representative Inslee characterized the MPA as "a first step to
tyranny." Today the procedure is used to thwart lesbians and gays, Inslee noted.
Tomorrow it may well be used against another minority.'03 Representative Frank of
Massachusetts made the chilling observation that Congress never does anything just once.
"When you have developed a particular procedure to use in defense of your views, that
gets used again and again."Io4 Given these warnings, it is clear that the MPA should be
soundly rejected, and the DOMA rescinded.
Today, thousands of cases attest to the strength of the Constitution and the
wisdom of the founders in apportioning governmental powers between three coequal
federal branches and between the state and federal governments. DOMA and the MPA
strike at this balance of power, thereby undermining the very foundation of government
as we have come to know it. Therefore, regardless of one's personal views of same-sex
maniage, or even about marriage in general, we should urge our elected officials in
Washington, D.C., and closer to home, to uphold the United States Constitution. We
must insist on maintaining the right ofjudicial review when Congress enacts laws that are
repugnant to the Constitution; laws that seek to strip disfavored minorities of access to
the federal courts. It is meaningless to fight for freedom abroad, when it is denied to us at
home.
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